George W. Bush really did lie about WMDs, and his aides are still lying for him

Feb 2006
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Ari Fleischer is a liar. He lies about stuff big and small. And as President George W. Bush’s press secretary during the run-up to the Iraq War, he participated in a large effort to exaggerate and misrepresent what the intelligence community believed about weapons of mass destruction and Iraq’s (negligible) links to al-Qaeda.

But Fleischer does not like it when people point out that he’s a liar, so he took to Twitter on Tuesday night to mark the anniversary of the invasion of Iraq and address what is, in his mind, a major tragedy surrounding the war: the fact that people sometimes point out that he and his friends are liars



Fleischer’s excuse doesn’t hold water

Fleischer does not address these concrete instances in which the administration lied. Instead, he outsources his analysis to the Robb-Silberman Commission, a bipartisan group empaneled by Bush in 2004 to figure out what went wrong in the intelligence community’s assessment of Iraq’s biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons capabilities.



Ari Fleischer

✔@AriFleischer

· Mar 19, 2019

Replying to @AriFleischer
The CIA, along with the intelligence services of Egypt, France, Israel and others concluded that Saddam had WMD. We all turned out to be wrong. That is very different from lying.

Ari Fleischer

✔@AriFleischer


After the war, a bipartisan group was created to determine what went wrong, particularly why the intelligence community's conclusions about Iraq were so different from what was found on the ground after the war.

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5:48 PM - Mar 19, 2019
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The commission did conclude that the CIA and other intelligence agencies made numerous mistakes in the run-up to the war. This is uncontroversial. While some noble dissenters, like the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and technical nuclear weapons experts at the Department of Energy, pushed back on the prevailing view in the intelligence community, the community as a whole clearly failed and vastly overestimated the likelihood that biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs existed.